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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

-vs-REGGIE McGEE,

Case No.
12412

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of Mr. McGee
for Subornation of Perjury in the First Degree rendered
in the Second Judicial District Court, in and for Weber
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Calvin Gould, presiding.
DISPOSITION lN THE LOWER COURT
Commencing on November 24, 1970, Mr. McGee was
trisd in the Second Judicial District Court before the
i-1.Jnoruble Calvin Gould, District Judge. On November
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25, 1970, the jury returned a verdict of guilty and judg.
ment was entered in accordance with that verdict.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The State submits ihat the judgment of the district
court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 23rd day of September, 1969, at approximately
4: 4G p.m. a .22 caliber pistol was stolen from the Sunset
Sporting Goods store in Roy, Utah (R. 87). Mr. Jim
Marberger, the manager of the store on that date, confronted Mr. McGee, found the stolen gun on his person
and proceeded to call the police (R. 86-92). Officer
Marion Hammond of the Roy City Police Department
investigated the crime. He proceeded to advise Mr. McGee
of his constitutional rights and Mr. McGee agreed to dis·
cuss the incident (R. 14, 15). Officer Hammond later
testified that at that investigation Mr. McGee admitted
taking the pistol (R. 116).

On January 14, 1970, the trial concerning the grand
larceny of the pistol was held in the Second Judicial Dis·
trict Court, in and for ·weber County, State of Utah. At
that trial one Eldridge Williams testified that he had
stolen the gun and Mr. McGee testified that he, himsell,
had not (R. 13, 24) .
The instant case thus arises from the testimony of
Mr. Williams and Mr. McGee at that trial.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
SUBORNATION OF PERJURY, UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-45-9 (1953) CONSISTS OF THE
ELEMENTS OF SUBORNATION AND PERJURY AND BOTH ELEMENTS WERE SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED BY THE STATE
TO CONVICT MR. McGEE OF THE CRIME
CHARGED.
Mr. McGee contends in his brief that the State did
not corroborate the testimony of Eldridge Williams specifically on the issue of the perjury. It is the position of
the State, as was it the position of Judge Gould, that no
such corroboration is nscessary in the instant case.

It is generally accepted in a trial for perjury that
the falsity of the alleg13dly perjured statement must be
established by the testimony of two independent witnesses
or one witness and corroborating circumstances. Therefore, the conviction for perjury may not be secured or
sustained on the uncorroborated testimony of one witness
to the falsity of the matter on which the perjury is assigned. Implicit in the evolution of this rule has been the
fear that innocent witnesses may be unduly harassed and
coerced resulting in an improper conviction. In the instant case, however, we have the situation where one witness did testify as to the perjury and the circumstanc~s
corroborated that testimony, to-wit: Eldridge Williams
was the perjurer and the suborned witness and his testi-
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mony wa:3 that he had committed perjury m the prior
Vial (R. 9-11).

In State v. Gleason, 86 U. 26, 40 P. 2d 222 (1935)

the Court held that the "two witness rule" or the "on9
witness with cor.rnbornting circumstances" rule did apply
to subornation of perjury cases in Utah. In effect, then,
the court said that in all subornation of perjury cases the
prosecution must prove both the perjury, by wsy of the
traditional rules above, dnd the subornation.
The State agrees that in the typical case of perjury
or subornation of perjury where the perjurer is defending
his innocence, the rules should be strictly adhered to.
However, where, as in the instant case, the perjurer himself testified that he had perjured himself in earlier testimony, that, in and of 1t~elf, is sufficient to corroborate
the testimony and establish the perjury. Again, the Court
in Gleason did not say that the "two witness" rule applied
in every case. Rather, one witness with corroborating circumstances would suffice in many instances. Gleason,
supra at 226.

The State does not stand alone in its position that
the confes3ion of the perjurer in open court to the perjury
is sufficient to e3tablish the perjury.

In the case of State v. Johnson, 374 P. 2d 504, 506,
(Mont. 1962), the Supreme Court of Montana said, in
reference to the "two witness rule":
"The rule is intended to prevent scm~·ilcus
prosecution, but the rule has no c.pplication whe··e
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the accused admits on the stand, 0~1 the trial for
the offense, that he has committed the offense .
. . . His admission obviates any need for protection from malicious prosecution." (Emphasis ours.)
In the subornation of perjury case of Commonwealth
v. Leitch, 107 A. 2d 909 (Penn. 1958), the Superior Court
of Pennsylvania said:
"The two-witness rule as to the truth of perjury prevails in Pennsylvania.... 'The purpose of
the rule is to protect one from a conviction of perjury upon the testimony of a single •vitness. Where
the perjurer admits his guilt, the reason for the
rule ceases to exist." (Emphasis ours.)
Such a position as is now taken by the State has also
appeared in many federal court cases. In United States
v. Buckner, 118 F. 2d 468 (2d Cir. 1941), the court held:

"It has been the general rule that a conviction
for perjury cannot be sustained by mere evidence
of inconsistent or contradictory statements made
under oath, but the falsity of the statement
charged to be perjured must be established by
either two independent witnesses, or by one witness who is supported by independent evidence
that is 'inconsistent with the innocence of the defendant.' While the proof in the present case did
not formally meet the above requirements, we
think the repeated admissions of the defenda..--it
that her testimony before the grand jury was false
was a fair substitute for the confirmatory testimony which is g:merally required in perjury cases .
. . . Her acts and testimony had become the pn-.ctical equivalent of a plea of guilty." J 18 F. 2d at
469.
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See also United States v. Nessanbaum, 205 F. 2d 93 (3d
Cir. 1953); and United States v. Green, 421 F. 2d 1237
(2d Cir. 1970).
The State, therefore, submits that the admission by
Eldridge Williams that he did lie about his stealing the
pistol in the earlier grand larceny trial was sufficient to
prove the perjury (R. 1, 10, 11, 123). The State also sub.
mits that the "one witness with corroborative circumstances" test as supplied by Gleason, supra, and followed
by Utah, was sufficiently fulfilled by the State at the trial
of Mr. McGee:
POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
STATE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT
MR. McGEE BY A JURY OF SUBORNATION
OF PERJURY.
Mr. McGee contends that the State never did prove
that Mr. Williams was suborned; to-wit: that Mr. Wil·
Iiams did not testify chat he was suborned. The State
can only suggest that the appellant scrutinize the record.
The State directs the appellant and this Court to page
125 of the record and the dialogue:
Q. Do you understand my last question?
What I am asking is did Mr. McGee suggest t:o
you as to what you should testify to in that trial?

A.

Yea.

Q. And what did he suggest you should say
in that trial?
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A.

That I lnd taken the gun.

Further in the record at page 127:
Q. Now was there any particular reason discussed as to why you should testify to this?

A. I wouldn't get in any trouble.
Q. And why did they say you wouldn't get
in any trouble?

A. Because I was a juvenile.
Still further on page 135:
Q. The conversation you have talked about
earlier today in this trial, the one where you don't
know where it was or when it was or where it was
at or anything else. Do you recall basically what
was said by you and by Reggie?

A. Basically, I don't. I just remember that
we talked about the trial and what I was supposed
to do.
Page 146:
Q. Okay. Now, did Mr. McGee suggest to
you or tell you what you should say at the first
trial?
A.

Yes.

Page 151:
Q.
exactly
suggest
cerning

Mr. Williams, now so that I understand
the situation, did or did not Mr. McGee
or tell you what to say in the trial congrand larceny?

8

A. Kind of like you know, just a sucgcstion.
But I did it on my own.
It is quite clear from the testimony of Mr. Williams
'
'chat although he wanted to lie for the defendant at the
grand larceny trial, it was the defendant who initially
procured such testimony.
Fin2.1ly, in Eght of the evidence and findings by the
jury, Mr. McGee ar>serts that his conviction was based
on insufficient evidence. It is well established in Utah
and other jurisdictions that it is the function of the jury
to weigh the evidence and base their verdict on all of the
circumstances. In State v. Hitesman, 58 U. 262, 198 P. 2d
769 (1921), this Court said:
"While the law is to the effect that a jury
may not arbitrarily ignore or disregard credible
evidence, then, nevertheless, need not blindly accept every explanation or statement.... The jury,
in considering all the facts and circumstances in
evidence, may refuse to give credence to the defendant's statements or explanations, or to those
of his witnesses, if such statements or explanations,
in view of all the facts and circumstances, seem
unreasonable or not well founded in fact." (Emphris ours.)
It is also well established in this state that the jury

may give whatever weight to a witness's testimony as they
see fit in light of the facts and circumstances presented.
In fact on numerous occasions this Court has determined
that the ju;'o:s are the sole judges of fact and the credibility cf \-i~"'.112~~sec;, of th; weight and effect of such evidence, and what inferences are to be drawn from that
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evidence. State v. Sullivan, 6 U. 2d 110, 307 P. 2d 212
(1957) ; State v. Crank, 105 U. 332, 142 P. 2d 247 (1943);
State v. Entrada, 119 U. 339, 227 P. 2d 247 (1951) ; and
State v. Moore, 111 U. 458, 183 P. 2d 973 (1947).

CONCLUSION
In view of the foregoing facts and authorities, the
State respectfully submits that Mr. McGee was in all
respects given a fair trial, and that perjury as an element
of subornation of perjury was established and that the
state presented substantial evidence as to the subornation
of Mr. Williams. The judgment of the district court should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAURENN.BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

